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Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables unconditionally secure communication between dis-
tinct parties using a quantum channel and an authentic public channel. Reducing the portion of
quantum-generated secret keys, that is consumed during the authentication procedure, is of signifi-
cant importance for improving the performance of QKD systems. In the present work, we develop a
lightweight authentication protocol for QKD based on a ‘ping-pong’ scheme of authenticity check for
QKD. An important feature of this scheme is that the only one authentication tag is generated and
transmitted during each of the QKD post-processing rounds. For the tag generation purpose, we
design an unconditionally secure procedure based on the concept of key recycling. The procedure is
based on the combination of almost universal2 polynomial hashing, XOR universal2 Toeplitz hash-
ing, and one-time pad (OTP) encryption. We also demonstrate how to minimize both the length
of the recycled key and the size of the authentication key, that is required for OTP encryption. Fi-
nally, we provide a security analysis of the full key growing process in the framework of universally
composable security.
I. INTRODUCTION
QKD is a method for distributing provably secure cryp-
tographic keys in insecure communications networks [1].
For this purpose, QKD systems encode information in
quantum states of photons and transmit them through
optical channels [2, 3]. The security of QKD is then based
on laws of quantum physics rather than on computational
complexity as is usually the case for public key distribu-
tion systems. This technology has attracted a significant
amount of interest last decades, and industrial QKD sys-
tems are now available at retail [4–6].
Besides transmitting quantum states in the QKD tech-
nology, legitimate users also employ post-processing via
an authentic public channel [2–5]. The post-processing
procedure consists of key sifting, information reconcilia-
tion, privacy amplification, and other supplemental steps.
The authentic classical channel, which prevents mali-
cious modification of the transmitted classical data by
an eavesdropper, is essential in order to prevent man-
in-the-middle attacks. The problem of providing classi-
cal channel authenticity for QKD has been considered in
various aspects in [7–14].
A conventional approach to the authentication prob-
lem in QKD systems is to use the Wegman-Carter
scheme [15, 16]. This scheme provides unconditional se-
curity needed for QKD purposes but at the same time
needs a pair of symmetric secret keys by itself. Moreover,
like in the case of the unconditionally secure encryption
with OTP [17], fresh secret keys are required for each
use of the authenticated channel. From this perspective,
the QKD workflow appears to be a key growing scheme,
since the parties already need to have a short pair of
pre-distributed keys before the launching the first QKD
round. For authentication in the second and subsequent
rounds, the parts of quantum-generated secret keys from
the previous round could be used. In Ref. [18] it was
shown that such an approach provides provable compos-
able security of the whole key growing scheme. However,
an increase in the performance of QKD systems faces
a number of challenges, which include the reduction of
authentication costs. An important task is then to find
hash functions that allow minimizing the secret key con-
sumption.
In our contribution, we present a practical authentica-
tion protocol specially designed for minimizing a secret
its key consumption. This goal is achieved by (i) reducing
the number of required generations of authentication tags
down to one per QKD round and (ii) reducing the size of
a secret key consumed by each tag generation. The re-
ducing tag generations is achieved by modification of de-
layed authentication scheme considered in Ref. [7, 19, 20]
into a ‘ping-pong’ scheme, in which the direction of the
tag transmission alters each following QKD round. In
order to minimize the secret key consumption on the tag
generation, we consider a combining almost universal2
polynomial hashing with XOR universal2 Toeplitz hash-
ing followed by the OTP encryption. This construction
allows employing a key recycling approach [14, 15], where
a permanent “recycling” key is used for polynomial and
Toeplitz hashing, while only keys for the OTP encryp-
tion require an update. We pay special attention to the
problem of optimizing a length of OTP keys since they
are subtracted from previously quantum-generated keys
and thus a need in their consumption reduces an effec-
tive QKD rate. Meanwhile, we show how to achieve a
quite reasonable length of the used recycled key, which
has to be picked up at once from the first QKD round.
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2We also study how the security of pre-shared authentica-
tion keys impacts further quantum-generated keys in the
universally composable security framework. As a result,
we obtain the authentication protocol with very low key
consumption, that is why we refer to it as a lightweight
authentication protocol.
Our work is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we describe
the unconditionally secure message authentication code
(MAC) scheme with the use of universal families. We
also review some known approaches to improving their
performance. In Sec. III, we present our lightweight au-
thentication protocol and show how to derive its parame-
ters with respect to the required security level. In Sec. IV
we provide security analysis of the full key-growing QKD
scheme. Finally, we summarize the main results and give
an outlook in Sec. V.
II. UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE
AUTHENTICATION
As soon as two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, have
an urge to communicate one each other, they almost in-
evitably face the problem of assuring that (i) received
messages are indeed sent by a claimed sender; (ii) no ad-
versary can forge messages such that fraud remains unde-
tected. This problem is referred to as the authentication
problem and it is known in cryptography for ages. For
example, signatures and seals are ancient yet eligible so-
lutions to authenticate handwritten documents and they
provide enough intuition about what authentication is.
Nevertheless, since the topic of this paper lies within the
area of digital communication, further we restrict our-
selves only to cryptographic authentication schemes [21].
From the very beginning, we put ourselves in the frame-
work of unconditional (information-theoretic) security,
where we do not rely on any assumption about the com-
putational abilities of an adversary (Eve).
A. Message authentication codes with strongly
universal hashing
A way for providing the authentication is to employ
the MAC scheme. The main idea behind is as follows.
Suppose that Alice and Bob have a common secret key
k. Then they use the following procedure:
(i) If Alice wants to authenticate message m, she gen-
erates a MAC or, simply, a tag t, which is calculated
based on m and k, and then sends a pair (m, t) to Bob.
(ii) Given a received pair (m′, t′), which could different
from (m, t) because of an attack by Eve, Bob generates
the corresponding tag tcheck from m
′ and k, and checks
whether the obtained tcheck is equal to t
′.
(iii) If so, he supposes that the message was indeed
sent by Alice and m′ = m (and t′ = t).
The main point behind this protocol is that, having the
intercepted a pair (m, t) but not possessing k, for Eve it
should be practically impossible to generate an alterna-
tive valid message-tag pair (m′, t′) with m 6= m′ in order
to cheat Bob. At the same time, it should be impossible
for Eve to generate a pair (m′, t′) for any m′ without any
authenticated message previously transmitted by Alice.
The described protocol can be realized with the tag
generation scheme on the basis of a strongly univer-
sal hash family. Strongly universal hash-functions have
been proposed in Ref. [15] and then formally defined in
Ref. [16]. A peculiar feature of this method is to employ
a whole family of functions with desired properties, but
no a single hash-function
Let us consider a set of all possible messages M, the
set of all possible tags T , and the set of keys K. Each key
k ∈ K defines a function from the family hk :M→ T .
Definition 1 (ε-almost strong universal2 family of func-
tions). A family of functions
H = {hk : M→ T }k∈K (1)
is called ε-almost strongly universal2 (ε-ASU2) if for any
distinct messages m,m′ ∈ M and any tags t, t′ ∈ T the
following two conditions are satisfied:
Pr
k
$←K
[hk(m) = t] =
1
|T | , (2)
Pr
k
$←K
[hk(m) = t, hk(m
′) = t′] ≤ ε|T | . (3)
If ε = |T |−1, then H is called strongly universal2 (SU2).
We note that that sometimes condition (2) is omitted.
Here we use k
$← K for defining a uniformly random
generation of an element k from the set K.
In Ref. [15] it has been demonstrated that if one em-
ploys this family, unconditionally secure authentication
can be achieved in the following way. Alice calculates
a tag for message m as t := hk(m), where k is a se-
cret key shared by Alice and Bob. Due to the fact that
from the Eve’s perspective, the secret key is a uniform
random variable, the probability of the impersonation
attack, where Eve tries to generate a valid pair (m′, t′)
without any message sent by Alice, is limited by |T |−1
according to Eq. (2). It is directly follows from Eqs. (2)
and (3) that for m′ 6= m the following expression holds:
Pr
k
$←K
[hk(m
′) = t′|hk(m) = t] ≤ ε. (4)
Therefore, the probability of the successful realization
of the substitution attack, where Eve tries to modify a
message (and probably a tag) originally sent by Alice, is
limited by ε.
Thus, the use of an ε-ASU2 family with small enough
values of ε allows legitimate parties Alice and Bob to
achieve unconditionally secure authentication. The con-
struction issues of appropriate ε-ASU2 families was stud-
ied in various aspects [15, 22–26]. Each of these approach
provides a family of hash-functions with its own trade-offs
3between sizes ofM and K, security parameter ε, and effi-
ciency. Below we consider several common approaches for
improving the performance of the authentication scheme
based on ε-ASU2 family.
B. Key recycling
Here a point of concern is an amount of a key, which
is distributed by legitimate parties and required for
ε-ASU2 hashing. It turns out that in order to achieve un-
conditional security, Alice and Bob have to use a distinct
key k for each message, i.e. the key consumption is sig-
nificant. This shortcoming can be avoided. In Ref. [15]
Wegman and Carter have proposed to choose a key k
once. For each generated tag, we use the XOR opera-
tion (bitwise modulo-2 addition) of the resulting tag with
a new one-time pad (OTP) key kOTP of τ bits length,
where τ is the tag size (here we assume that T = {0, 1}τ )
and τ  log |K|. Consequently, in order to authenticate
each new message legitimate parties recycle the key k and
review OTP keys kOTP only. Therefore, the key recycling
procedure may decrease the demand in secret keys sig-
nificantly.
Moreover, the key recycling scheme allows using a
weaker class of function family, namely, ε-almost XOR
universal2.
Definition 2 (ε-almost XOR universal2 family of hash
functions). A family of hash functions
H = {hk : M→ {0, 1}τ}k∈K (5)
is ε-almost XOR universal2 (ε-AXU2), if for all distinct
m,m′ ∈ M, uniformly random chosen k ∈ K and any
c ∈ {0, 1}τ ,
Pr
k
$←K
[hk(m)⊕ hk(m′) = c] ≤ ε, (6)
where ⊕ stands for XOR. If ε = |T |−1, then the family
of such hash functions is called XOR universal2 (XU2).
Consider the following authentication scheme based on
an ε-AXU2 family
H = {hk : M→ {0, 1}τ}k∈K (7)
with the use of the key recycling scheme. One can see
that this is equivalent to the construction of a new family
of the following form:
Hext = {hk,kOTP : M→ {0, 1}τ}k∈K,kOTP∈{0,1}τ (8)
with
hk,kOTP(m) := hk(m)⊕ kOTP. (9)
One can see that the resulting family Hext is ε-ASU2.
Therefore, the authentication scheme based on the use
of an ε-AXU2 family with the key recycling scheme is
equivalent to the authentication scheme on the basis of
an ε-ASU2 family. Thus, it allows one to achieve both
unconditionally secure authentication and reducing the
size of the secret key consumed by each tag generation.
It is important to note that in this scheme the use
of the key recycling scheme leads to a disclosure of the
used hash function after a number of rounds (the num-
ber of rounds can be made arbitrarily large). A security
proof of the considered scheme in a composable secu-
rity framework is provided in Ref. [14]. It is shown that
schemes with authenticating n messages based on the
key recycling scheme and ε-AXU2 family is nε-secure.
Following the notion of the composable security frame-
work [14], it means that an abstract distinguisher with
unlimited computational resources, has an advantage at
most nε in distinguishing the considered scheme from an
ideal authentication system. Such a notion of security is
particularly important for security analysis of the QKD
post-processing procedure.
C. Combining families of hash functions
A useful technique for construction of ASU2 hash fam-
ily with desired properties is based on the composition of
a given family ASU2 and a family with weaker require-
ments, such as a universal2 family [27].
Definition 3 (ε-almost universal2 family of functions).
A family of functions
H = {hk : M→ T }k∈K (10)
is called ε-almost universal2 (ε-AU2) if for any distinct
messages m,m′ ∈M and uniformly chosen k ∈ K,
Pr
k
$←K
[hk(m) = hk(m
′)] ≤ ε (11)
If ε = |T |−1, then H is called universal2 (U2).
A composition of ε1-AU2 and ε2-ASU2 families results
in (ε1+ε2)-ASU2 family [16]. Therefore, having two hash
families, one has a useful tool for obtaining a resulting
ε-ASU2 family with desired properties.
The similar strategy is applicable in principle for con-
structing an ε-AXU2 family using the composition ε1-
AU2 and ε2-AXU2 families.
Theorem 1. Let
H(1) = {h(1)k :M→ T 1}k1∈K1 (12)
be an ε1-AU2 family, and
H(2) = {h(2)k : T 1 → {0, 1}τ}k2∈K2 (13)
be an ε2-AXU2 family. Then the following family
H ={hk1,k2 = h(2)k2 ◦h
(1)
k1
:M→ {0, 1}τ}k1∈K1,k2∈K2 (14)
is an (ε1+ε2)-AXU2 family. Here ◦ holds for the function
composition.
4See Appendix A 1 for the proof. This theorem allows
us to obtain an (ε1 + ε2)-ASU2 hash family as the com-
position of ε1-AU2 family with ε2-AXU2 family and the
OTP encryption. We note that this construction allows
obtaining a possibility of recycling a key required in ε1-
U2 family with ε2-AXU2 family.
III. LIGHTWEIGHT AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL FOR QKD
In this section, we consider an authentication task in
the framework of QKD and introduce our lightweight au-
thentication protocol. The protocol is based on the key
recycling scheme and the universal families combination
approach (described above) as well as on a concept of the
ping-pong delayed authentication.
A. Ping-pong delayed authentication
The workflow of a QKD device can be split into two
main stages. The first “quantum” stage is related to the
preparing, transmitting and measuring quantum signals
(usually, attenuated laser pulses) through an untrusted
quantum channel (optical fiber or free space). As the re-
sult of the first stage, the parties, Alice and Bob, obtain a
set of records regarding preparing and measuring events.
These records are usually referred to raw keys. The sec-
ond stage is the classical post-processing procedure. It
is aimed on the extraction (or distillation) of secret keys
from raw keys, or coming to a conclusion that such an
extraction is impossible due to eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) ac-
tivities. The criteria here is that the quantum bit error
rate (QBER) value exceeds a certain critical threshold [2].
In the latter case, the parties just abort the QKD session.
The post-processing stage typically consists of sifting,
parameter estimation, information reconciliation, and
privacy amplification procedures [28]. During these pro-
cedures, the parties communicate with each other via a
classical channel, which has to be authenticated in an
unconditionally secure way. It means that any tamper-
ing with classical communication by Eve in the classical
channel should result in aborting QKD protocol in the
same way how it is aborted in the case of its interception
in the quantum channel. If the QBER value is below
the threshold and no tampering in classical communica-
tion is detected, Alice and Bob obtain a pair of provably
secret keys. Then the post-processing procedure can be
repeated again with a new pair of raw keys. We refer to
such sequences of stage repeating as rounds.
The main point of concern is that the unconditionally
secure authentication scheme itself requires a symmetric
key. That is why the process of QKD can be considered
as a key-growing scheme (or secret-growing scheme): Al-
ice and Bob have to share some pre-distributed keys in
order to provide authentication in the first QKD round
and they use a portion of quantum-generated keys for au-
Put distilled key from
round N-1 and N into
the pool of secret keys
Abort QKD process
Yes
No
Raw key input
Nth round of the secure key distillation using 
classical post-processing
Authentication tag
calculation
Tag correct?
Raw key input
Authentication tag transmission
Put distilled key from
round N and N+1 into
the pool of secret keys
Abort QKD process
Yes
No
Raw key input
(N+1)th round of the secure key distillation using 
classical post-processing
Authentication tag
calculation
Tag correct?
Raw key input
Authentication tag transmission
...
...
Alice Bob
FIG. 1. Scheme of the QKD post-processing procedure with
delayed authentication. Each of legitimate parties generate
and check authentication tags once for the whole traffic during
the post-processing procedure.
thentication in the following rounds. That is why reduc-
ing the portion of quantum-generated secret keys, that
is consumed during the authentication procedure, is of
significant importance for improving the performance of
QKD systems.
It turns out that it is reasonable to check the authen-
ticity of the classical channel in the very end of the post-
processing round, rather than to add an authentication
tag to each classical message separately. The idea is that
if Eve has tampered with a classical channel, then the
legitimate parties are able to detect this event by au-
thenticating all the traffic in the classical channel once.
If the authentication check procedure fails, then secret
keys will not be generated. Meanwhile, in the favourable
case, if Eve does not interfere with classical communica-
tion, the authentication key consumption will be small.
However, an important point is that, actually, there
are two classical channels which authenticity should be
checked: from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice. In
order to obtain secure symmetric keys, each of the legiti-
mate parties has to be sure that all the sent and received
messages are not modified by Eve.
To address this issue we propose the following solution
for authenticity check, that it is applied through pairs
of rounds rather than a single round. The scheme of
the designed solution is presented in Fig. 1. During each
5of the post-processing rounds the unconditionally secure
authentication tag is transmitted from one party to an-
other in a ‘ping-pong’ manner: If in N th round a tag is
sent from Alice to Bob, then in (N + 1)th round a tag
is sent back from Bob to Alice, and so on. The tag is
computed after a final privacy amplification step and is
based on a string composed of all the income and out-
come classical messages transmitted within the current
post-processing round. After receiving the tag, the legit-
imate party checks its validity by computing a verifica-
tion tag from his (her) own versions of sent and received
classical messages. If the check passed, then the party
becomes sure that (up to the fixed error probability) the
classical communication was not modified by Eve, so the
obtained keys are provable secure. Otherwise, the party
terminates the whole QKD process, tries to reach the
partner on another channel, and compare the state of
secret pools.
In the case of a successful check, the party adds the
obtained key into the pool of secret keys. Moreover, the
party also adds to the distilled key from the previous
round (if the number of the current round is greater than
one). This is because at the current round the party
who receives the tag becomes sure that in the previous
round, where he (she) was a tag sender, the authenti-
cation check was also passed. Otherwise, the protocol
should be already terminated on the other side and no
valid tag should come at the current round.
Thus, the key consumption is defined by computing a
single tag of all the classical messages used in the round.
The exception is a final round where additional authen-
ticated acknowledgment message from a party who per-
formed a check is required. The generation of this mes-
sage could be considered as a fictitious post-processing
round where no secret key is produced.
B. Instantiation of universal families
Here we consider the problem of minimizing a key con-
sumption for computing a tag with a given error prob-
ability threshold. For this purpose, we employ the key
recycling approach based on using AXU2 family with the
OTP encryption (see Subsection II B). We construct an
AXU2 family by combining AU2 and XU2 families.
Let us consider a value εauth that describe an error
probability during the authentication procedure. On the
one hand, with with a given fixed εauth it is preferable to
have a length of the final tag to be as small as possible to
minimize the OTP key consumption. This is due to the
fact that the length of the tag is equal to the one of the
OTP key during each round of the authentication proce-
dure. Therefore, it is optimal to use an XU2 family with
the minimal possible hash tag length τ = −dlog2 εauthe
(hereinafter d·e and b·c stand for the standard ceil and
floor rounding operations).
On the other hand, it is also important to minimize the
length of the recycled key as well. It immediately follows
from the Stinson bound [29], that a key size defining an
element from XU2 family |K| is at least as large as a
length of input message |M|, which is quite expensive
for use in the QKD. In order to decrease the length of
the required key, we employ a preceding XU2 hashing
with using a function from AU2 family for decreasing the
length of the input string. Such a pre-compression comes
together with an additional collision probability ε1 cor-
responding to the employed ε1-AU2 family. However, we
can choose ε1  2−τ such that the total error probability
ε1 + 2
−τ becomes almost equal to the optimal value 2−τ .
In the result, we obtain a scheme which has an optimal
OTP key consumption with a recycled key length of the
order of log log |M|. Let us then consider choice of the
particular ε-AU2 and XU2 families.
For an ASU2 family we choose a modification of the
well-known method of polynomial hashing [30]. This ap-
proach works as follows. It starts from calculating a poly-
nomial over a finite field with coefficients given by the
input and the calculation point given by the random key.
Consider a prime number p given in the following form:
p = 2w + δw, (15)
where integers w and δw be a smallest as possible (see
Appendix B for a list of such primes). Let µ be an upper
bound on a length of an authenticated message, that is a
maximal total length of all the messages used in a single
round of the QKD post-processing. Consider a family
H(1) = {h(1)k : {0, 1}≤µ → {0, 1}w+1}k∈{0,1}w (16)
with
h
(1)
k (m) = str
(
l∑
i=1
int(mi)int(k)
i−1 (mod p)
)
. (17)
Here {0, 1}≤µ stands for a set of all bit-strings of length
less or equal to µ, l := d(µ+ 1)/we, str and int are stan-
dard functions providing a transition between bit-string
and integer number representation, and {mi}li=1 are w-
bit chunks of m, obtained first by concatenation of m
with 1 followed by a block of zeros in order to achieve
an extended string of length lw and then by splitting the
resulting string into l of w-bit pieces.
A precise statement is then as follows:
Theorem 2. H(1) is an ε1-AU2 family with
ε1 = dµ/we 2−w. (18)
See Appendix A 2 for the proof.
From the practical point of view, it is also useful to
consider a generalized family of the following form:
H(1)λ = {hk1,...,kλ(·) = h(1)k1 (·)‖ . . . ‖h
(1)
kλ
(·) :
{0, 1}≤µ → {0, 1}λ(w+1)}(k1,...,kλ)∈{0,1}wλ . (19)
This family is obtained by concatenation of λ ≥ 1 in-
dependent instances of functions from family H. The
following statement holds true:
6OTP key
Recycled key
AU2 polynomial
hashing
Compound string of all the sent and received messages
Tag
XU2 Toeplitz
hashing
FIG. 2. Scheme for the the authentication tag calculation
procedure in the proposed lightweight authentication protocol
for QKD.
Theorem 3. H(1)λ is an ελ1 -AU2 family with ε1 of the
following form:
ε1 = dµ/we 2−w. (20)
See Appendix A 3 for the proof.
We remind here that the idea behind this generaliza-
tion is that one can decrease the collision probability
down to the desired level without an increase in the em-
ployed ring modulus defined by the value of w. Thus, it
is possible to set w = 31 or w = 63 in order to perform all
the calculation with 32 and 64-bit integers, correspond-
ingly.
As the XU2 family for our protocol, we use Toeplitz
hashing [24] given by multiplying a message with the
Toeplitz matrix in the form:
Tk :=

kβ kβ+1 kβ+2 . . . kβ+α−1
kβ−1 kβ kβ+1 . . . kβ+α−2
...
...
...
. . .
...
k1 k2 k3 . . . kα
 , (21)
which is defined by a binary string of the following form:
k = (k1, . . . , kα+β−1). (22)
Consider a family
H(2) = {h(2)k : {0, 1}α → {0, 1}β}k∈{0,1}α+β−1 , (23)
with
h
(2)
k (x) = Tk · x (mod 2), (24)
where x is treated as the column vector, and · stands for
the dot-product. A precise statement is then as follows:
Theorem 4. H(2) is an XU2 family.
See Appendix A 4 for the proof.
In order to combine Toeplitz hashing with polynomial
hashing, we have to set α = λ(w + 1), and β = τ , where
τ is the length of the final authentication tag. Conse-
quently, we obtain a scheme illustrated in Fig. 2.
w = 31 w = 63
µ, Mbits Lrec, bits LOTP, bits Lrec, bits LOTP, bits
1 135 40 167 40
4 199 40 167 40
16 199 40 167 40
64 231 40 231 40
256 263 40 231 40
TABLE I. Quantum key consumption on recycled key Lrec
and OTP key LOTP for different bound on total length of
classical messages transmitted during a single QKD round µ.
The security parameter is fixed at the level εauth = 10
−12.
The length of the recycled key combined from keys for
defining H(1)λ and H(2) elements is given by the following
expression:
Lrec = 2λw + λ+ τ − 1, (25)
while the length of OTP key is given by LOTP = τ . The
final security parameter is as follows:
ε = 2−τ + dµ/weλ 2−λw. (26)
It grows polynomially with the total size of messages in
the classical channel during the post-processing round µ.
Finally, we consider an optimal way of choosing param-
eters for the proposed authentication scheme. We start
with a given upper bound on tolerable authentication
error probability εauth and the maximal total length of
messages µ. We also restrict ourself to the consideration
only two cases of w = 31 and w = 63.
In order to have an the smallest possible OTP key
consumption, it is practical to set the following value:
τ := bεauthc+ 1. (27)
The remaining part of εauth could be used for AU2 family,
so we have to find a minimal possible integer λ so that
the following condition is fulfilled:
dµ/weλ2−λw ≤ εauth − 2−τ . (28)
The performance of the suggested scheme for different
values of µ and w ∈ {31, 63} and the fixed value of the
security parameter εauth = 10
−12 is presented in Table I.
For optimal size of the OTP key, the length of the recy-
cled key is low, and it seems to be easy to accumulate
the required size during the very first QKD round.
We also provide a comparison of our approach per-
formance with experimental results on the realization of
a fast and versatile QKD system reported in Ref. [31].
In the considered QKD setup, each round of the post-
processing procedure was executed for sifted key blocks
of length Lsift = 995, 328 bits. For the authentication
purposes, the key recycling technique with ASU2 family
from Ref. [26] was used. In the realized authentication
scheme a 127-bit tag was generated for every 220 bits of
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FIG. 3. Comparison of the relative authentication costs re-
constructed from experimental results presented if Ref. [31]
and corresponding values in the case of employing proposed
lightweight authentication protocol.
classical communication providing the authentication se-
curity parameter auth = 10
−33. As the main figure of
merit for the authentication efficiency, we consider a rel-
ative authentication cost c defined as a fraction of secret
key consumed for authentication in the following rounds.
It has the following form:
c =
LOTP
Lsec
=
bεauthc+ 1
Lsift · ηpa . (29)
Here Lsec is a length of a secret key produced after pri-
vacy amplification procedure, and ηpa is the privacy am-
plification compression coefficient (Lsec = Lsift · ηpa).
We present a comparison of the relative authentica-
tion costs calculated from the experimental data pre-
sented in Table 1 of Ref. [31] with corresponding values
for proposed lightweight authentication protocol given by
Eq. (29). One can see that the lightweight authentica-
tion protocol reduces the relative authentication costs by
≈ 28 times (see Fig. 3).
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF KEY GROWING
Here we consider the security of the proposed authen-
tication protocol in the framework of the full key-growing
workflow. The scheme is presented in Fig. 4. Let us recall
that before the first round of the QKD process Alice and
Bob have to pre-distribute a pair of secret keys in order
to provide the required classical authenticated channel.
However, the ping-pong principle of the employed de-
layed authentication scheme requires the pre-distributed
keys in the second round as well, since the parties come
to the secret key pool only in the second round. We work
here in the framework of the universally composable se-
curity [18].
In order to provide authentication during first and
second rounds we use the considered AU2+XU2+OTP
scheme (see Sec. III). The length of the pre-distributed
keys is as follows:
Lpred = Lrec + 2LOTP. (30)
The crucial point is that the pre-distributed keys have
to be secure only up to the moment of the second au-
thentication check: In the case of successful completion
of the first two QKD rounds the parties can discard the
pre-distributed keys (or even announce them publicly),
and switch to the use of quantum-generated keys.
We use εpred(t1) as a security parameter for the pre-
distributed keys at the moment of the authentication
check of the first QKD round happening at time t1. How-
ever, a quite nontrivial question is quantifying εpred(t1),
since in most practical scenarios the pre-distribution is
based on some computationally secure algorithms (cur-
rently used public-key algorithms or post-quantum algo-
rithms), or employs low-entropy “passwords”, known by
Alice and Bob Here for our purposes, we define εpred(t1)
as an advantage which can have an eavesdropper in dis-
tinguishing pre-distributed keys and ideal keys in an as-
sumption that she has access to technological capabilities
accumulated by mankind by the time t1.
The resulting security parameter of keys generated in
the first QKD round is given by the following expression:
ε1 = εpred(t1) + εauth + εQKD, (31)
where εQKD is the security parameter of the used classi-
cal post-processing procedure including parameter esti-
mation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplifi-
cation stages. We note that in contrast to the security
of the pre-distributed keys, the value of εQKD is calcu-
lated exactly based on the parameters of the employed
post-processing algorithms. For modern QKD setups its
typical range is from 10−9 up to 10−12 [28]. The key, that
is obtained from the first round, has to be split into three
parts: (i) the recycled authentication keys of length Lrec,
(ii) OTP authentication keys of length LOTP, and (iii)
the rest part can be used for any external applications.
For authentication purposes during the second QKD
round at the moment t2, we use the recycled key with the
second OTP block from the distribution (see Fig. 4). The
security of the pre-shared key is εpred(t1) + εstore(t1, t2),
where εstore(t1, t2) is an additional advantage that the
adversary obtain in distinguishing pre-distributed keys
from ideal keys using all achievable technological capa-
bilities during storage time from t1 up to t2. According
to the paradigm of composable security, the resulting se-
curity parameter of the generated keys is given by the
following expression:
ε2 = εpred(t1) + εstore(t1, t2) + 2(εauth + εQKD). (32)
The resulting key have to be split into two pieces: the
first OTP part of length LOTP and the rest part, which
could be used in external applications.
For the authentication in the N th round (N ≥ 3) the
parties employ a recycled key from the first round and
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FIG. 4. Key expansion principle with the use of the lightweight authentication protocol.
OTP key from (N − 2)th round. The security parameter
of the generated key is as follows:
εN = εpred(t1) + εstore(t2, t1) +N(εauth + εQKD). (33)
We note that security now depends only on the number of
iterations, but not on the point in time when the genera-
tion occurs. We also have to point out that εN , given by
Eq. (33), defines a security of all the quantum-generated
keys during N rounds.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this work, we have developed the novel lightweight
authentication protocol for QKD systems. We have de-
scribed the practical unconditionally secure authentica-
tion scheme for QKD systems, which is based on combin-
ing two basic ideas: (i) the proposed ping-pong scheme,
which allows generating only a single authentication tag
during a QKD post-processing round, and (ii) uncondi-
tionally secure tag generation based AXU2 family with
OTP encryption, which allows further reducing key con-
sumption by using key recycling. We also have demon-
strated how to construct suitable AXU2 families using
the combination of polynomial AU2 and Toeplitz XU2
families. Finally, we have obtained the scheme which
minimizes the OTP key consumption for given authenti-
cation error bound εauth.
The proposed scheme is promising for industrial QKD
setups due to the possible enhancement of effective se-
cret key generation rate. Another interesting area, where
the considered approach could be implemented, is QKD
networks. The idea is that in order to generate uncon-
ditionally secure secret keys between two parties in a
QKD network using a trusted node scheme, all classical
communication should be authenticated in an uncondi-
tionally secure manner. For that purposes, a considered
implementation of the key recycling approach could be
employed.
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Appendix A: Proofs of the theorems
1. Proof of the Theorem 1
Proof. Consider two distinct element m and m′ fromM.
We need to prove that for any c ∈ {0, 1}τ , the following
relation holds:
Pr
k1
$←K1
k2
$←K2
[hk1,k2(m)⊕ hk1,k2(m′) = c] ≤ ε1 + ε2. (A1)
First, we set c = (0, . . . , 0), then the condition
hk1,k2(m)⊕ hk1,k2(m′) = c (A2)
reduces to
hk1,k2(m) = hk1,k2(m
′). (A3)
The LHS of Eq. (A1) can be written as follows:
Pr
k1
$←K1
[h
(1)
k1
(m) = h
(1)
k1
(m′)]+
Pr
k2
$←K2
[h
(2)
k2
(h
(1)
k1
(m)) = h
(2)
k2
(h
(1)
k1
(m′))|h(1)k1 (m) 6= h
(1)
k1
(m′)]
× Pr
k1
$←K1
[h
(1)
k1
(m) 6= h(1)k1 (m′)]. (A4)
The first term in Eq. (A1) is bounded by ε1 according to
the definition of an ε1-AU2 family, while the second term
can be bounded by ε2 according to the definition of an
ε2-XU2 family. Thus, the final upper bound is given by
ε1 + ε2.
Then we set c 6= (0, . . . , 0). One can see that in order
to have
hk1,k2(m)⊕ hk1,k2(m′) = c (A5)
9it is necessary to have
h
(1)
k1
(m) 6= h(1)k1 (m′). (A6)
Then we can rewrite LHS of Eq. (A1) in the following
form:
Pr
k2
$←K2
[h
(2)
k2
(h
(1)
k1
(m))⊕ h(2)k2 (h
(1)
k1
(m′)) = c|
h
(1)
k1
(m) 6= h(1)k1 (m′)] Pr
k1
$←K1
[h
(1)
k1
(m) 6= h(1)k1 (m′)]. (A7)
One can see that the value of Eq. (A7) is bounded by
the value of ε2 according to the definition of an ε2-XU2
family, that ends the proof.
2. Proof of the Theorem 2
Proof. Consider two distinct input bit strings m and m′
of length not larger than µ. The condition on the collision
event is as follows:
l∑
i=1
(int(mi)− int(m′i))int(k)i−1 = 0 (mod p), (A8)
where {mi}li=1 and {m′i}li=1 are w-bit chunks of m and
m′ correspondingly and l := d(µ+ 1)/we. Since m 6= m′,
there is at least one mi 6= m′i, so the LHS of Eq. (A8)
can be considered as a non-zero polynomial of the degree
that is not larger than l−1. The collision corresponds to
the case, where the value random k taken from {0, 1}w
turns out to be a root of this polynomial. According to
the fundamental theorem of algebra for finite fields, there
are no more than l−1 roots, and the collision probability
is upper bounded by the following value:
l − 1
|K| ≤ dµ/we2
−w, (A9)
since d(µ+ 1)/we − 1 ≤ dµ/we.
3. Proof of the Theorem 3
Proof. Consider two distinct input strings m and m′ of
length not larger than µ. The condition of the identity
of
hk1,...,kλ(m) = hk1,...,kλ(m
′) (A10)
is equivalent to a set of identities h
(1)
ki
(m) = h
(1)
ki
(m′) for
all i = 1, . . . , λ. Since all ki are independent, we obtain
Pr
(k1,...,kλ)
$←{0,1}wλ
[hk1,...,kλ(m) = hk1,...,kλ(m
′)] =
λ∏
i=1
Pr
ki
$←{0,1}w
[hki(m) = hki(m
′)] ≤ ελ2 (A11)
due to results of the Theorem 2.
4. Proof of the Theorem 4
Proof. Consider two distinct binary vectors x and x′ from
{0, 1}α and some binary vector c from {0, 1}β . Let ∆x =
x⊕x′. Denote by j the index of the first nonzero element
of ∆x (we note that j always exists since x 6= x′). The
condition
hk(x)⊕ hk(x′) = c (A12)
can be rewritten in the following form:
Tk ·∆x = c. (A13)
We can rewrite Eq. (A13) as follows:
kβ+j−i +
α∑
γ=j+1
kβ+j−i+γ∆xγ = ci for i = 1, . . . , β.
(A14)
Since all the elements of k are independent random bits,
it easy to see that for each i = 1, . . . , β
Pr
k
$←K
[kβ+j−i +
α∑
γ=j+1
kβ+j−i+γ∆xγ = ci] =
1
2
(A15)
independently from each other. Thus, the total proba-
bility Pr
k
$←K
[Tk ·∆x = c] is given by 2−β .
215 + 3 225 + 35 235 + 53 245 + 59 255 + 3
216 + 1 226 + 15 236 + 31 246 + 15 256 + 81
217 + 29 227 + 29 237 + 9 247 + 5 257 + 9
218 + 3 228 + 3 238 + 7 248 + 21 258 + 69
219 + 21 229 + 11 239 + 23 249 + 69 259 + 131
220 + 7 230 + 3 240 + 15 250 + 55 260 + 33
221 + 17 231 + 11 241 + 27 251 + 21 261 + 15
222 + 15 232 + 15 242 + 15 252 + 21 262 + 135
223 + 9 233 + 17 243 + 29 253 + 5 263 + 29
224 + 43 234 + 25 244 + 7 254 + 159 264 + 13
TABLE II. Prime numbers in a form 2w + δw for w from 15
up to 64.
Appendix B: Prime numbers for polynomial hashing
In Table A 4, we provide a list of prime numbers which
can be used in the considered scheme of polynomial hash-
ing.
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